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Abstract
We present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between asset markets that are
distinguished only by the levels of capital invested in each. Investment in that market with the
greatest amount of capital earns the lowest risk premium. Intermediaries optimally trade oﬀ
the costs of intermediation against fees that depend on the gain they can oﬀer to investors for
moving their capital to the market with the higher mean return. Those fees also depend on the
bargaining power of the investor, in light of potential alternative intermediaries. In equilibrium,
the speeds of adjustment of mean returns and of capital between the two markets are increasing
in the degree to which capital is imbalanced between the two markets.
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11 Introduction
We present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between markets. Equi-
librium conditional mean rates of return vary across markets according to the levels of
capital invested in the respective markets. As a matter of supply and demand within each
market, that market with the greater amount of capital earns lower conditional mean re-
turns. Given a suﬃcient disparity in the capital levels in the markets, intermediaries ﬁnd
it optimal to search for investors in the market with “surplus” capital and oﬀer them the
opportunity to move their capital to the other market. An intermediary charges suppliers
of capital a fee that is based on their gain from the move, and based on the degree of
competition in the market for intermediation.
This paper is motivated by extensive empirical evidence, some of which is reviewed
in the last section, that supply or demand shocks in asset markets, in addition to caus-
ing an immediate price response, also lead to adjustments over time in the distribution
of capital across markets and adjustments over time in relative conditional mean asset
returns, in a way that reﬂects delays in the adjustments of investors’ portfolios. We are
particularly interested in how those adjustments are aﬀected by the endogenous behavior
of intermediaries.
In our equilibrium model, the greater the relative diﬀerence in capital levels across the
markets, the more intensive are intermediaries’ eﬀorts to re-balance the distribution of
capital across the markers, and the greater the rate of convergence of the two mean rates
of return toward a common level.
An example is the limited mobility of capital into reinsurance markets, documented
by Froot and O’Connell (1997), who write: “Our results suggest that capital market
imperfections are more important than shifts in actuarial valuation for understanding
catastrophe reinsurance pricing. Supply, rather than demand, shifts seem to explain
most features of the market in the aftermath of a loss.” In subsequent work, Froot
(2000) continues: “We ... ﬁnd the most compelling (evidence) to be supply restrictions
associated with capital market imperfections and market power exerted by traditional
reinsurers.”
We are particularly interested in the impact of competition among intermediaries on
the equilibrium degree of capital mobility. The impact of competition among intermedi-
aries is through two channels. First, intermediaries do not internalize the entire impact
2of their search activity on the market because each gets only a fraction of the aggregate
intermediation fees. This prompts intermediaries to search more as the number of inter-
mediaries increases. Competition has a second and potentially oﬀsetting eﬀect on capital
mobility through the impact of fee bargaining on lower incentives to intermediate. In the
simplest setting that we analyze, the second eﬀect dominates: Increasing the number of
intermediaries reduces capital mobility.
With trading frictions that delay portfolio adjustments, there can be periods of time
over which assets with identical risks have diﬀerent mean returns. More generally, there
can be substantial diﬀerences in mean returns across assets that are due not only to cross-
sectional diﬀerences in “fundamental” cash-ﬂow risks, but are also due to the degree to
which the distribution of asset holdings across investors is ineﬃcient (relative to a market
without intermediation frictions). Empirical “factor” models of asset returns do not often
account for factors related to the distribution of ownership of assets, or related to likely
changes in the distribution of ownership. Exceptions include the recent work of Coval
and Staﬀord (2007) and Lou (2009), who note that the conditional mean returns of an
equity tend to be lower due to price pressure when mutual funds owning that equity
are experiencing liquidation-motivated outﬂows, and that the conditional mean returns
recover as price pressure abates.
A signiﬁcant body of theory examines the implications of search frictions for asset
pricing. For example, diﬀerences in search frictions across diﬀerent asset markets are
treated by Weill (2008) and Vayanos and Wang (2007). Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen
(2005) study the implications of search frictions in a single asset market with marketmak-
ing. In the context of a single asset market, Duﬃe, Gˆ arleanu, and Pedersen (2007) and
Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weil (2008) model recoveries in mean returns, after a shock to
the preferences of investors, corresponding to a gradual re-allocation of the asset to more
suitable investors, rather than by cross-market capital dynamics as here. Earlier search-
based models of intermediation include Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Bhattacharya
and Hagerty (1987), Moresi (1991), Gehrig (1993), and Yava¸ s (1996).
Related work on the implications of capital market frictions for asset pricing dynamics
includes Basak and Croitoru (2000) and He and Krishnamurthy (2007). In terms of
some objectives and model features, the study by Gromb and Vayanos (2007) is closely
related to ours. Our respective approaches were developed independently. Common
3to our models, local hedgers are immobile, while arbitrageurs can work across markets,
driving returns toward fundamental levels, subject to frictions that prevent them from
perfectly equating returns in the two markets. Our respective approaches, however, are
quite diﬀerent. Our model focuses on capital dynamics and their impact on risk premia.
2 The Market Setting
This section presents a stylized model for the endogenous adjustment of capital and risk
premia across markets. There are three types of agents: (i) local hedgers; (ii) investors,
who provide risk-bearing to hedgers in each of two local markets; and (iii) intermediaries
(or asset managers) who provide the fee-based service to investors of moving capital
from one market to the other. In equilibrium, investors move their capital, subject to
intermediation frictions, into that market with the higher premium for the same risk.
We ﬁx a probability space (Ω,ℱ, ) and a common information ﬁltration {ℱ  :   ≥ 0}
satisfying the usual conditions.1
In each of two ﬁnancial markets, labeled   and  , a continuum (a non-atomic measure
space) of local risk-averse agents own short-lived risky assets that they are willing to
sell at or above their respective reservation prices. Equivalently, they are willing to buy
insurance contracts against the risks to which they are exposed. These “hedgers” are not
mobile across markets. They can be viewed in this respect as relatively unsophisticated
in the use of cross-capital-market transactions, or as having high transactions costs for
trading outside of their local markets. A continuum of investors that supply capital have
access to cross-market trading, subject to intermediation frictions to be described. These
suppliers of capital are risk-neutral, oﬀering to bear the risk that hedgers desire to shed
in return for any strictly positive risk premium. In an insurance context, one might think
of these suppliers of capital as stylized versions of the “Names” that supply risk bearing
capacity to the insurance market known as “Lloyd’s of London.”
The total levels of capital available in the two markets at time   are     and    ,
respectively. Capital can be reinvested continually at the discretion of each provider of
capital, that is, “rolled over” in the short-lived assets that are continually made available
1See, for example, Protter (2004) for the usual conditions and for other standard properties of stochastic processes
to which we refer.
4for sale by hedgers. Each unit of capital that is currently invested in market   at time  
is paid cash dividends at the going market “reset rate”  (   ), where  (⋅) is a strictly
decreasing continuous function. The payout rate  (   ) is continually reset in double
auctions at which the supply and demand for the asset in market   are matched at each
point in time. As the amount of capital available to invest in the asset is increased, the
market-clearing reset rate declines. In Appendix A, we provide an example in which  ( )
is the equilibrium insurance premium in a market with   units of insurance capital.
In return for the payout rate  (   ), the provider of each unit of capital in market
  agrees to absorb the risky increments of a payoﬀ process    that is L´ evy, that is, has
independently and identically distributed increments over non-overlapping time periods
of the same length. (Examples include Brownian motions, Poisson processes, compound
Poisson processes, and linear combinations of these.) The idea is that the short-lived
risky asset promises 1+     + (   )   at time  +   per unit of capital invested at time
 , in the instantaneous sense. More precisely, each unit of capital invested in market   at
any time  , and rolled over continually in that market until some time   >   accumulates
to    units of capital, according to the stochastic diﬀerential equation     =   −     ,
and in the meantime generates cash ﬂows at the rate   −  (   ). (The notation “  −”
means the left limit of the path of   at time  , that is, the level just before any jump at
time  .)
In the illustrative case of an insurance market, we can take    to be a compound
Poisson process that jumps down at the arrival times of loss events, and is otherwise
constant. In this case, one unit of capital invested at time   pays the supplier of capital
1 +  (   )   at time   +    (in the above instantaneous sense) if there is no loss event,
and if there is a loss event, has a recovery value of 1 + Δ   , where Δ    is the jump size.
The jumps of    are bounded below by −1, preserving limited liability. If the loss events
have mean arrival rate   and a loss-size distribution   with mean  , then the mean loss
rate is   . In this case, as the amount   of capital gets large, the market clearing payout
rate  ( ) cannot go below   + , where   > 0 is the time preference rate of the investors.
Investors optimally supply all of their local capital inelastically, so long as the mean rate
of return  ( ) −    is strictly larger than their time preference rate  .
As with typical asset-management contracts used by hedge funds and private-equity
partnerships, cash payouts are not re-invested into the capital pool. For us, this is merely
5a modeling convenience.
We assume that    =    +    and    =    +   , where the market-speciﬁc processes   
and    as well as the common component    are independent L´ evy processes. We assume
that    and    have the same distribution, so that the two markets have identically and
symmetrically distributed risks. This symmetry simpliﬁes the calculation of an equilib-
rium and has the further illustrative advantage that any diﬀerences in the conditional
expected returns in the two markets are due solely to diﬀerences in the capital levels of
the markets.
If there were no capital-market frictions, investors would move capital between the
markets so as to obtain the higher reset rate, and in doing so would equate the payout
rates  (   ) and  (   ), and thereby equate     and     at all times. Indeed, given the
symmetrically distributed returns of the two markets, investors would do so even if they
were risk-averse, provided that they have no other hedging motives.
Frictions in the movement of capital may, however, lead to unequal levels of capital
in the two markets. If, for example,     <    , then the conditional excess mean rate of
return of the risky asset in market   exceeds that in market   by  (   )− (   ), despite
the identical idiosyncratic and systematic risks of the two assets. Whichever market has
“too much capital” receives the lower risk premium.
An investor chooses how to deploy re-invested capital between the two markets, subject
to the available trading technology. Letting    denote the net cumulative amount of
capital moved by a particular investor from market   into market   through time  , the
investor’s capital,    
   in market   and    
   in market  , jointly satisfy
  
 
   =  
 




   =  
 
  −      +    .
Capital can be moved only through the services of an intermediary, and at the times
of contact with an intermediary, as will be explained. A model for a proportional
transactions-fee process   will be determined in equilibrium, once we have introduced a
model for intermediation of capital movements. A investor is inﬁnitely-lived, and has a
utility of
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6where ∣ ∣  denotes the total variation of   up to time  . A minor alteration of the model
that allows for randomly timed exit and entrance of investors would be equally tractable.2
For simplicity, we have assumed that transactions costs are paid directly by investors, and
not deducted from the capital moved from market to market.
Each investor takes as given the total capital processes    and    of the respective
markets as well as the proportional transactions-cost process  . Among other equilib-
rium consistency conditions, investors form correct conjectures regarding the dynamics of
(  ,  , ).
Intermediaries contact investors in order to proﬁt from fees for moving their capital
from one market to another. In equilibrium, at any time, only investors in that market
with greater capital agree to have any of their capital moved to the other market. Be-
cause a investor has linear preferences and takes (  ,  , ) as given, it is optimal when
contacted to move either no capital or to move all capital to the other market.3
We let    ( ) denote the level of capital in market   of investor   at time  . Conditional
on the intermediation contact intensity process  , investors are contacted, pairwise inde-
pendently at the conditional mean rate   . In a manner similar to that of Weill (2007),
the law of large numbers allows us to calculate the aggregate rate of movement of capital.
Letting  (⋅) denote the non-atomic measure over the space of investors, the total rate
at which capital is moved from market   to market   is almost surely4
 
  1{ at > bt}   ( )  ( ) =   1{ at > bt}
 
   ( )  ( )
=   1{ at > bt}   .
Likewise, the rate at which capital moves from market   to market   is   1{ bt > at}   .
2For this, investors would exit at exponentially distributed times that are pairwise independent, and consume their
capital at exit. New investors would appear in proportion to the current levels of capital. Any diﬀerence between exit
and entrance rates would thus be subtracted from the proportional drifts of the capital accumulation processes  a
and  b.
3If he or she has any capital in the market with more total capital, then all of this investor’s capital will be moved,
provided the proportional transaction-costs process   is not too large, and this is the case in any equilibrium for our
model, as we shall see once the model is completely speciﬁed. Thus, although we allow that a given supplier of capital
may initially have non-zero capital in both markets, all of his or her invested capital will optimally be held in just one
of the two markets at any time after the ﬁrst time of contact with an intermediary.
4One can apply the results of Sun (2006), relying on a particular style of product measure space for states of the
world and investors.
7Given the intermediation contact intensity process   and initial conditions for capital
in each market, we let   
   denote the total capital in market   at time  . Given an
associated transaction-cost process  , the marginal value to a supplier of one additional
unit of capital in market   at time   is
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where    is the cumulative number of switches back and forth between the two markets
through time   by the holder of this unit of capital, and the market indicator  ( ) is  
or  , depending on whether, at time  , the accumulated capital    is currently located
in market   or  . This capital thus accumulates according to
    =   −    ( −)( ),
with initial condition    = 1. The market-indicator process   is a marked point process
with an initial condition at time   of  ( ) =  , and with an intensity of jumping from
market   to market   at time   of   1{ ￿
is > ￿
js}. In the equilibrium that we shall describe,
the value of switching from market   to market   is strictly positive if and only if   
   >   
  .
The marginal value of moving capital is thus
 
 
  = max( 
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  ) − min( 
 
  , 
 
  ).
At each time  , intermediaries charge investors some fraction   ∈ [0,1] of the gain
  
  from switching each unit of capital. That is, the proportional intermediation fee is
  
  =    
 . One can view   as the bargaining power of an intermediary. We later treat
the eﬀect of intermediary competition on  .
To assume that an investor can move capital from one market to another only through
intermediation is tantamount to an assumption that the alternative technologies for mov-
ing capital are prohibitively expensive. For this, it would be enough, in equilibrium,
that for any alternative trading technology such as directly contacting and negotiating
with hedgers, the proportional cost of moving capital exceeds the marginal value   
  of
switching. This is a strong assumption that simpliﬁes the model and its solution. We will
calculate the marginal switching value in examples and show that it can be arbitrarily
small depending on the parameters of the intermediation technology. So, the assump-
tion that alternative capital movement technologies would not be used by investors is
reasonable in some circumstances.
8Our model can also be generalized by supposing that each investor has an alternative
technology by which opportunities to move capital to the other market arrive at random
times, independent across investors, with a constant mean arrival rate. This would cause
only minor modiﬁcations to the structure and solution of our model. We avoid it for
simplicity. Increasing the mean arrival rates of these alternative capital-shifting opportu-
nities reduces the average degree of imbalance of capital and the diﬀerence in risk premia
between the two markets, and thus reduces the proﬁtability of intermediation.
An intermediary’s rate of cost for applying contact intensity    is assumed to be    ,
for some technological cost coeﬃcient   ≥ 0. For example, doubling the expected rate at
which investors are contacted costs twice as much.5 We restrict   to be a progressively-
measurable process so that, at each time, the intermediary chooses a contact intensity
that depends only on information that is currently available. The maximum feasible
contact intensity of the market is some constant   > 0.
3 Equilibrium with Monopolistic Intermediation
We ﬁrst take the monopolistic case,   = 1. In the next section, the solution of the
monopolistic case leads immediately to a solution for the oligopolistic case via a simple
equivalence result.
3.1 The Monopolist’s Problem
A monopolistic intermediary’s total rate of fee revenue is    max(   ,   ) Φ , where Φ  =
  
  is the gain from switching capital under policy  . This assumes that the intermediary
and supplier of capital both correctly anticipate that the intermediary’s future contact
intensity is indeed given by the process  . We will impose this consistency property as
part of the deﬁnition of an equilibrium.
Given the initial conditions   
 0 =    and   
 0 =   , and given a gain-from-switching
process Φ, the intermediary’s utility for a contact intensity process   is
 (  ,  ,Φ, ) =  
   ∞
0
 
−    [ Φ  max( 
 
  , 
 
  ) −  ]  
 
.
5This can be viewed as a contact technology in which the intermediary adjusts a “broadcast” intensity, for example
adjusting the rate of purchase of advertisements or other forms of market-wide intermediation eﬀorts. This diﬀers
from a model in which, for example, contacting twice as many individuals at a given intensity costs twice as much.
9We assume that the parameters are such that this utility is ﬁnite, which is the case
in the equilibria that we analyze. We restrict attention to intermediation policies that
depend on the available information only through the current capital levels (   ,   ).
The intermediary might otherwise prefer to commit once and for all time to a path-
dependent intensity policy that could, at some future time, be dominated by another
policy available at that time, given the current capital market conditions at that time.
The inability to commit to an intermediation strategy may in principle be overcome by
sophisticated punishment threats, as in Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) and Mailath and
Samuelson (2006). In such equilibria, if the intermediary deviates, investors would update
their beliefs about the intermediary’s strategy in a way that harms the intermediary. Such
equilibria are based on sophisticated oﬀ-equilibrium-path investor beliefs, which are not
in the spirit of our assumption that investors are less sophisticated than intermediaries.
Another possible justiﬁcation for our focus on Markov equilibria is the fact that more
sophisticated equilibria unravel in ﬁnite-horizon models where (possibly state-dependent)
stage games have a unique Nash equilibrium.
Given the symmetry of the two markets, it suﬃces to characterize equilibrium behavior
in terms of
   = max(   ,   )
   = min(   ,   ).




  = 1{ at> bt}      + 1{ at≤ bt}     
  
 
  = 1{ at≤ bt}      + 1{ at> bt}     .
From the L´ evy property, (  ,   ) has the same joint distribution as the primitive payoﬀ
processes (  ,  ).
Because we restrict attention to an intermediation intensity process   that depends
only on current capital levels, and because of symmetry, we can suppose that    =
Λ(  ,  ) for some measurable policy function Λ : ℝ2
+ → [0, ] with the property that
there is a solution to the associated stochastic diﬀerential equation
    = −Λ(  ,  )      +      
 
  (2)
10    = Λ(  ,  )      +      
 
  . (3)
Letting ℒ denote the space of intermediation intensity processes of this form, and
given an assumed gain-from-switching process Φ, the intermediary solves the problem
sup
 ∈ℒ
 ( , ,Φ, ). (4)
An equilibrium is a pair ( ,Φ) consisting of an intermediation intensity process   that
attains the supremum (4) given Φ, and such that Φ =   
 . This deﬁnition includes consis-
tency with the optimality for investors to move their capital, in exchange for the marginal
fee determined by Φ, when contacted by the intermediary, and includes consistency be-
tween the conjectured and actual dynamics for capital movements and search intensity.
In the some of the cases that we analyze, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium.
3.2 Homogeneous Case
In order to obtain the simpliﬁcation associated with homogeneity, we suppose that the
inverse demand function  (⋅) is of the form   +   −  for positive constants  ,  , and  .
As explained in the insurance setting of Appendix A, this can be arranged by suitable
assumptions on the cross-sectional distribution of hedgers’ dis-utilities for insurance pre-
mia and losses. Because the constant   is common to the two markets, it has no eﬀect
on beneﬁts to switching capital, and can be taken to be zero without loss of generality.
Also without loss of generality, we can take   = 1 by re-scaling. That is, the equi-
librium behavior for ( , ) is the same as that for (1, / ). Because the intermediary has
linear time-additive preferences and because of the homogeneity of  , and therefore of
  , the ratio   =  /  of total capital in the over-capitalized market to total capital
in the under-capitalized market determines the optimal intermediation intensity. Thus,
we can further assume the independence of    and    without loss of generality because
any common L´ evy component would have no eﬀect on the ratio of   to   . (The sole
exception is a case of common jumps with a jump-size distribution that supports −1, in
which case there is a non-zero probability that    and    can be zero simultaneously. We
rule out this exception.)
Consistent with the insurance example, we suppose that    and    are of the form
    =    +    , where   is a constant and    and    are independent compound Poisson
11processes with common jump intensity   and a given jump-size probability distribution
 . The proportional payoﬀ processes processes    and    could also be given a common
Brownian component without aﬀecting our analysis, for this also has no eﬀect on the
relative proportions of capital in the two markets. Cases with market-speciﬁc Brownian
components are analyzed in Appendix L. Likewise, the constant drift rate   plays no
role in the analysis of optimal intermediation, and can be taken to be zero without loss
of generality for purposes of determining equilibrium intermediation policies. The eﬀect
of non-zero   on actual capital levels can be reintroduced later with the scaling by     of
both    and   .
We begin our analysis with the simple case in which the jump-size distribution   places
all mass at −1, meaning complete loss of invested capital at an event. We later relax this
to random partial recovery, for which we oﬀer an illustrative numerical example. For the
zero-recovery case, a loss event in the market with less capital would cause the capital
ratio   /   to jump to +∞. While we allow this formally, the analysis can be done
similarly in terms of the ratio   /  , which remains in [0,1] almost surely, and our results
apply with only notational changes. Provided the initial conditions include a strictly
positive amount of capital in at least one market, the probability that    and    ever
reach zero at the same time is 0. The partial-recovery case that we later consider has
strictly positive capital levels in both markets at all times after time zero, given a strictly
positive level of capital in at least one of the markets at time zero.
Let  (  ,  ) and  (  ,  ) denote the present values to investors of the marginal
future cash ﬂows per unit of capital held at time   in the over-capitalized and under-
capitalized markets, respectively, as deﬁned by (1). Subject to the usual smoothness
and integrability conditions, Itˆ o’s formula implies that these functions satisfy the coupled
equations
   ( , ) =  ( ) −   ( , ) Λ( , ) +   ( , ) Λ( , )
+(1 −  )Λ( , )( ( , )−  ( , )) −   ( , ) +  ( ( ,0) −  ( , ))
  ( , ) =  ( ) −   ( , ) Λ( , ) +   ( , ) Λ( , )
+ ( ( ,0) −  ( , )) −   ( , ),
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The ﬁrst of these equations states that the
time-preference eﬀect   ( , ) is equal to the expected rate of gain per unit of capital
12to an investor currently in the “large market,” that with greater capital. This rate of
gain ﬁrst includes dividend payout rate  ( ). The next two terms capture the rate of
change of  (  ,  ) due to intermediated ﬂows of capital out of the large market and into
the small market, respectively. The expected rate of gain in value to those in the large
market also includes the expected rate of gain (1 −  )Λ( , )( ( , ) −  ( , )), net of
intermediation fees, associated with switching to the higher-premium market. The ﬁnal
two terms reﬂect the expected rate of impact of loss events. As there is no recovery value
to large-market investors of a loss event in the large market, the ﬁrst of these expected
loss rates is   ( , ). A loss event in the small market replaces the value  ( , ) with
 ( ,0), which explains the ﬁnal term. The equation for small-market investors is similarly
explained.
The marginal gain from switching capital is then
 
 
  =  
Λ(  ,  ) ≡  (  ,  ) −  (  ,  ). (5)
3.3 The Bellman Equation
Given the marginal value   Γ( , ) for moving capital that is associated with an assumed
policy function Γ, the intermediary’s value function is
  ( , ) = sup
Λ
 
   ∞
0
 
−  Λ(  ,  )(    
Γ(  ,  ) −  )  
 
. (6)
We assume that   ( , ) is ﬁnite, which is the case in the equilibria that we analyze.
The associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is
0 = sup
ℓ∈[0, ]
{−   ( , ) +  ( , , ,ℓ,Γ)}, (7)
where, by Itˆ o’s formula,
 ( , , ,ℓ,Γ) = −  ( , )ℓ +  ( , )ℓ + [  ( ,0)+  ( ,0)−2  ( , )]+ℓ(   
Γ( , )− ).
Proposition 1 Given an assumed intermediation policy Γ, suppose that ˆ   is a bounded
diﬀerentiable function satisfying the HJB equation (7). Then ˆ   is the value function   of
the optimization problem 6 and any policy ( , )  → Λ( , ) which, for each ( , ), attains
the supremum (7) is an optimal policy given the switching-gain function   Γ associated
13with the policy Γ. If, moreover, Λ = Γ, then ( ∗,Φ) is an equilibrium where, for all  ,
 ∗
  = Λ(  ,  ) and Φ  =   Λ(  ,  ).
The proof is by a traditional martingale veriﬁcation argument given in Appendix B.
We will show that the assumption that the candidate value function ˆ   is bounded and
diﬀerentiable is satisﬁed by the candidate we calculate in our main parametric example
with   = 1. Thus, the proposition implies that the HJB equation characterizes optimality
in this setting.
The homogeneity of the payout-rate function   implies that   and   are homogeneous
of degree − . As a result,  ( ,0) =  0 −  for some positive constant  0 to be determined.
Let  ( ) =   Λ( ,1) and  ( ) = Λ( ,1). Homogeneity of   Λ implies that   solves the
ordinary diﬀerential equation
0 = −  ( ) + (1 −  
− ) −   ( ) 
′( ) + (−  ( ) −   
′( )) ( )  (8)
−(1 −  ) ( ) ( ) +  [ 0(1 −  
− ) − 2 ( )].
The relevant boundary condition is  (1) = 0, corresponding to no gain from switching
when the two markets have the same capital levels. Using (8), Appendix C contains a
proof of the following result that the switching gain  ( ) is strictly positive when capital
levels are unequal.
Proposition 2 Given any intermediation policy Λ,  ( ) is strictly positive for   > 1.
That is, given Λ, investors in the over-capitalized market optimally accept the oﬀer to
move all of their capital out of the over-capitalized market whenever given the opportunity.
3.4 Trigger Intermediation Solution
We now solve for the equilibrium intermediation policy for the special case in which
 ( ) =   +  / . As we have explained, we can take   = 0 and   = 1 without loss
of generality. In this case, for any admissible policy Λ, the switching gain function   Λ
is homogeneous of degree −1. Thus, taking   Λ as given, the optimal present value  
of intermediation proﬁts is homogeneous of degree 0, that is,   ( , ) =   ( / ,1) for
  > 0. In particular, given any reduced switching-gain function  , the policy Λ achieving
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Figure 1: Optimal search policy and solution homogeneity.
Λ( , ) =  ( / ) for some  (⋅). Because the switching-gain function   depends on the
policy function  , we have a ﬁxed-point problem: Find a pair ( , ) such that: (i) given  ,
the policy   is optimal, and (ii) given  , the marginal gain function   is that determined
by   through (8).
In Appendix F (Proposition 9), we show that any equilibrium must be of the “bang-
bang” form Λ( , ) = 0 for   <    and Λ( , ) =   for   ≥   , for some trigger ratio
  ≥ 1 of the capital level in the over-capitalized market to the capital level in the under-
capitalized market. This is intuitive. Because the HJB equation is linear, we anticipate
the optimality of switching from minimal to maximal intensity whenever there is suﬃcient
marginal gain from moving capital from one market to the other. This occurs when the
levels of capital in the two markets are suﬃciently diﬀerent. Such a trigger policy is
illustrated in Figure 1. Our problem is reduced to ﬁnding the optimal trigger ratio  ,
which then completely determines equilibrium behavior.
In order to identify the constant  0, we use a conservation equation: the sum of the
value functions of all investors and of the intermediary must be equal to the present
value of all cash dividend payments of the hedgers net of the search costs incurred by the
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where  ( ) = log(1 + 1/ )/¯  .
The diﬀerential equation (8) for   thus reduces to
(  + 2  +  [(1 −  ) +  ]) ( ) +  (1 +  )  
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For   ∈ [1, ], the solution is trivial:
 ( ) =
1 +   0







In particular, we verify that  (1) = 0, consistent with the observation that the net present
value of moving capital from one market to the other is 0 when the levels of capital in
the two markets are the same.
We can re-write (10) as







 ,   ≥  , (13)
where   = (  + 2  + (1 −  ) )/  and   = (1 +   0)/ .
Letting  ( ) =   ( ,1), the HJB equation reduces to
0 = sup
ℓ∈[0, ]
{−  ( ) − ℓ  
′( ) − ℓ 
2 
′( ) + 2 [ 0 −  ( )] + (   ( ) −  )ℓ}, (14)
where  0 =   ( ,0) =   ( ,0). Therefore,
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 0 <  0, (16)
and
  ( ) +  
′( ) (1 +  ) =   +    ( ),   ≥  , (17)
where   = (  + 2 )/  and   = (2  0 −   )/ .
Appendix E contains a proof of the following monotonicity and regularity of  (⋅).
Monotonicity of the value  ( ) in the capital heterogeneity measure   is not an obvious
result, in particular because the switching gain  ( ) is not in general monotonic.
16Proposition 3 (Value Function Monotonicity) For any trigger capital ratio  ,
the solution   of (14)-(17) is bounded, increasing, and strictly increasing on [ ,∞).
The smooth-pasting condition  ′( ) = 0 implies the trigger capital ratio
  = 1 +
 (  + 2 )
(1 +   0) 
. (18)
A proof of the following result guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of a trigger
strategy is found in Appendices G (existence) and H (uniqueness).
Proposition 4 (Existence and Uniqueness) There exists a unique trigger capital-
ization ratio   satisfying (9), (10), (11), and (18).
This analysis leads to the following characterization of equilibrium, which includes the
result that in the absence of search costs, the intermediary does not exploit his position
to restrict movement of capital, but rather provides maximal intermediation, nevertheless
generating fee income from his or her imperfect ability to instantaneously move capital
from one market to the other due to the upper bound   on contact intensity.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the payout-rate function   is of the form  ( ) =   +  / .
Then there exists a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium intermediation process is inactive
(   = 0) whenever the ratio of capital levels in the two markets is between 1/  and  ,
for some capital-ratio trigger  , and is otherwise at full capacity (   =  ). The capital
ratio trigger   is given by (18), where the constant  0 is given by (9). If there is no
intermediation cost (  = 0), then the intermediary always works at full capacity (that is,
  = 1).
Relation (18) also provides an upper bound on the equilibrium capital-ratio trigger
level:
  ≤ 1 +
 (  + 2 )
 
.
This bound is useful for computing numerical solutions to the optimization problem. An
algorithm for computing the constant  0, and thus  , is given in Appendix I.
3.5 Partial Recovery
We now allow the fraction   recovered after a loss to be randomly distributed on (0,1).
This will be the basis for our numerical illustration of the model.
17Subject to the usual smoothness and integrability conditions, Itˆ o’s formula and the
deﬁnition (1) of the value of a unit of capital held in market   imply that the value  ( , )
of a unit of capital in the over-capitalized market satisﬁes:
0 = −  ( , ) +  ( ) +   ( , ) −  Λ( , ) +   ( , ) Λ( , )
+  (   <  )[ ( ( ,  )∣   <  ) −  ( , )]
+  (   ≥  )[ ( (  , )∣   ≥  ) −  ( , )]
+(1 −  ) ( ( , ) −  ( , )) +  [ ( ( ,  ) −  ( , )].
A similar equation for  ( , ) is found in Appendix J. Unlike the zero-recovery case,
these equations cannot be reduced to a single equation for the gain   from switching.
Using the homogeneity of   as before, one can solve the HJB equation for the inter-
mediary’s value   ( , ) in the form  ( / ) =   ( , ), as a function of the capital ratio
  =  / , in the form
0 = sup
ℓ∈[0, ¯  ]
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In this setting, the intermediary’s value function cannot be computed by solving a
diﬀerential equation because  ′( ) depends on  ( ′) for all other  ′. We have the same
issue to overcome in order to solve for  ( , ) and  ( , ). Exploiting the linear structure
of the problem, however, Appendix J provides a numerical algorithm for solving the
corresponding integro-diﬀerential equations. The associated smooth-ﬁt condition is
   ( ) −   =  (1 +  ) 
′( ). (19)
3.6 Numerical Illustration
We provide an illustrative example of equilibrium for the case of partial recovery. We
take the parameters   = 0.04,   = 1.5,   = 0.04,   = 0.1,   = 1/30. We assume beta-
distributed recovery (one minus proportion lost) on (0,1), with parameters (5,1). The
equilibrium intermediation trigger ratio   of capital in the over-capitalized market to
capital in the under-capitalized market is found numerically to be 1.465.
Figure 2 shows simulated sample paths of the capitalization ratio    =   /   and the
immediate return  (  )/ (  ) to a supplier of capital, before transactions fees, associated





















































Figure 2: Simulated sample paths of the capitalization ratio,  t =  t/ t, and the return from switching,  ( t)/ ( t).
with switching capital into the under-capitalized market. Figure 3 shows the present
values, with one unit of capital in the under-capitalized market, of future cash ﬂows to a
provider of one unit capital in the over-capitalized market (net of fees), to a provider of
one unit of capital in the under-capitalized market (net of fees), and to the intermediary
(in the form of fees net of search costs). These are, respectively,  ( ), ℎ( ), and  ( ), and
depend on the ratio   =  /  of the level of capital   in the over-capitalized market to the
level   of capital in the under-capitalized market.
4 Intermediary Competition
We now provide solutions for equilibria with oligopolistic or perfectly competitive markets
for intermediation.
There are two channels through which the intermediary competition might aﬀect the


























Cross-market capital ratio  
Figure 3: Value function  ( ) of the intermediary and the marginal values  ( ) and ℎ( ) of capital held in the
over-capitalized and undercapitalized markets, respectively.
equilibrium level of intermediation oﬀered by the market. First, a large intermediary
internalizes the impact of intermediation intensity on the heterogeneity of capital levels
across the two markets, and thus the degree to which there are gains from trade to outside
investors. The more intensive is the intermediation policy, the lower are the potential
future gains from trade to be split with a investor moving capital. Second, when in
contact with a investor, an intermediary considers the ability of the investor to compare
the intermediation fee oﬀered with the fees oﬀered by other intermediaries. This plays a
role in determining the eﬀective bargaining power of the intermediary, and through that
channel, the impact on the proﬁtability of intermediation. We will examine the eﬀects of
both channels, and start by taking bargaining power as ﬁxed.
4.1 Intermediary Competition At Fixed Bargaining Power
For a given bargaining power  , equilibrium trigger policies for the oligopolistic case can be
translated directly from the case of monopolistic intermediation, by a change of variables.
20For the oligopolistic case, we take   identical intermediaries, each with an upper bound
 /  on intermediation intensity, and with the same proportional cost   of intermediation.
The monopolistic case (  = 1) is the special case considered in the previous section.
For the case of perfectly competitive intermediation, we treat “  = ∞” by considering
a non-atomic measure space of intermediaries of total mass 1. Each intermediary in this
continuum has maximal intermediation intensity  , again providing a market-wide total
intermediation capacity of  . Thus, all cases have the same feasible market dynamics and
costs.
We again consider only Markov equilibria. Equilibrium incorporates the degree to
which intermediaries internalize the impact of their intermediation intensity on the het-
erogeneity of capital levels across markets. We ﬁrst analyze the case of zero recovery,
then brieﬂy comment on the case of partial recovery.
For an oligopolistic equilibrium in trigger strategies, each of the   intermediaries has




−   ( ) +
 
−
(  − 1)
 






(  − 1)
 
  1{ ≥ } + ℓ 
 
  
′( ) + 2 [ 0 −  ( )] + (   ( ) −  )ℓ
 
, (20)
reﬂecting the presumption by the given intermediary that the   − 1 other intermediaries
have adopted a speciﬁc trigger capital ratio  . The equilibrium condition is that the same
trigger policy is optimal for the given intermediary. Veriﬁcation of the HJB solution as
the value function is as for the monopolistic case.
Thus, an equilibrium for the  -intermediary problem is again given by bang-bang
control for all intermediaries, each exerting no eﬀort when    <   and maximal inter-
mediation intensity  /  whenever    ≥  , for a trigger capital ratio  . We will show
that optimality implies that there is no intermediation at or below the capital ratio  
satisfying the smooth pasting condition  ′( ) = 0. This, along with (20), implies that
   ( ) −   = 0. (21)
From (21), we see that an intermediary’s optimization problem in a setting with  
intermediaries is equivalent to that of a monopolistic intermediary with the same max-
imum intermediation intensity  / . Indeed, for a given threshold  , the monopolistic
21and oligopolistic cases yield the same function   determining proportional intermedia-
tion fees, and hence the same smooth-pasting condition (21). In fact, this is actually
the unique equilibrium, even allowing for the possibility of non-trigger strategies! To see
this, consider any Markov equilibrium, not necessarily of the trigger-ratio form, and let
  denote the function determining the associated gain from switching. An intermediary’s
HJB equation is of the form (20), except that (i) the aggregate of other intermediaries’
contact intensities may be almost arbitrary, and (ii) the value functions may vary across
intermediaries. Owing, however, to the form of the HJB equation, the indiﬀerence con-
dition is nevertheless given by (21), and thus is the same for all intermediaries. This
shows that any Markov equilibrium must be symmetric and of the trigger form.6 In fact,
repeating arguments from the monopolistic case leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Consider the case of zero recovery and   intermediaries. There exists
a unique Markov equilibrium. This equilibrium is symmetric and determined by a trigger
capital ratio equal to that of a monopolistic intermediary with the oligopolistic maximal
contact intensity  / .
We now informally discuss the case of partial recovery. Recall from (19) the smooth-
pasting condition for the monopolistic case:
   ( ) −   =  (1 +  ) 
′( ). (22)
One can see that the trigger capital ratio   is determined not only by the function  
determining the marginal gain from moving capital, but also by the derivative  ′( ) of
the intermediary’s value function. In order to understand the impact of oligopolistic
intermediation, suppose that intermediaries were to use, instead of the optimal trigger
ratio  , the equilibrium trigger ratio of a monopolist with the same aggregate capacity
for intermediation. In that case,   would be unchanged. Each intermediary, however,
would receive only a fraction 1/  of the total intermediation fees. The righthand side
of (22) is thus lowered, implying that intermediaries prefers to continue intermediating
after the capital ratio exceeds the monopolistic trigger. This is the ﬁrst channel through
which oligopolistic competition matters: Because an oligopolistic intermediary does not
6The trigger form comes from showing, as in the monopoly case (Lemma 2), that the function    →   ( ) is
increasing.
22internalize the full impact of his search on intermediation fees, he has a greater incentive
to intermediate. More precisely, an intermediary does not work for opportunities to move
capital when the immediate net marginal beneﬁt of doing so,    ( ) −  , is below the
marginal value  (1 +  ) ′( ) associated with future capital heterogeneity. For a given
trigger ratio  , an intermediary’s value function   declines in direct proportion to the
number   of intermediaries, and, hence, so does the derivative  ′. This implies that the
term  (1 + ) ′( ) diminishes with  , while the immediate marginal beneﬁt    ( ) −  is
unchanged, keeping   constant. Thus, as   increases, the incentive to intermediate at the
given trigger ratio   becomes strictly positive, prompting intermediaries to search more.7
As   goes to inﬁnity, an intermediary’s value function goes to zero (because the size of
the pie to be shared among intermediaries is uniformly bounded above by 2/ ), and the
derivative  ′( ) also goes to 0. The limit as   diverges is the competitive equilibrium, in
which the trigger capital ratio   is determined by
   ( ) −   = 0.
With perfect competition, an intermediary has no impact on aggregate search activity,
and thus cares only about the immediate net beneﬁt from switching.
Competition for intermediation, does, however, play a role through the sharing of
gains from trade when in contact with an investor. So far, we have taken the fraction   of
gains that are allocated to intermediaries to be ﬁxed. We next consider the implications
of market structure for the determination of  .
4.2 Endogenous Bargaining Power
With   > 1 intermediaries, we suppose that some fraction    of investors are “well con-
nected,” meaning that as they prepare to switch capital from one market to another, they
are in simultaneous contact with more than one intermediary. The number of intermedi-
aries with whom a given investor is in contact could also be random, exploiting the law of
large numbers, in which case    can be taken to be the probability that a investor, when
contacted, is in contact with more than one intermediary. Intuitively, a well-connected
7When there is zero recovery from a loss event, the after-event heterogeneity (which is inﬁnite) does not depend
of the pre-event heterogeneity. In that case, intermediaries already ignore the impact of their search activity on
heterogeneity and the monopolistic solution coincides with the competitive one.
23investor has more bargaining power than a “captive” investor, one who is in contact with
only one intermediary.
When modeling this intuition with a bargaining game, an issue is whether the con-
tacted intermediary is assumed to know whether the investor is in contact with other
intermediaries. We will take this case.8 Another modeling approach is a multilateral
bargaining game with complete information, as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996). The Shap-
ley value from such a bargaining game is identical to that of the solution below.9 We
consider a bargaining procedure ` a la Rubinstein (1982), in which the investor and a par-
ticular intermediary alternate oﬀers. In our continuous-time setting, the times between
oﬀer rounds can be treated as arbitrarily small, so the inter-round discount factor can
be taken to be 1. In that case, the investor and intermediary agree immediately to split
the surplus according to the Nash bargaining solution. The investor’s share depends on
his outside option. If the investor is captive, his outside option is simply  ( ), the value
of remaining in the over-capitalized market. Thus, the Nash product associated with a
proportional fee of   is
[ ( ) +   −  ( )][ℎ( ) −   −  ( )],
which is maximal at   =  ( )/2, corresponding to   = 1/2, meaning an equal splitting of
the gains with the intermediary.
For a well-connected investor, the Nash product is
[ ( ) +   −  ( )][ℎ( ) −   −  ( ) − (1 −  0) ( )],
where  0 is the conjectured proportion of the gain from trade that the investor would
pay to another intermediary if this ﬁrst round of bargaining were to break down. The
Nash product is maximized at   = 0, for a proportional intermediary share of   = 0,
corresponding to the extraction of all surplus by the well-connected investor.
If the number of intermediaries in contact with the investor is known only by the
8It would be possible to allow for one-sided information. The fees derived could be obtained as equilibrium outcomes
of a bargaining process, although there may be additional equilibria. See, for example, Sutton (1986). For an
alternative approach to treating uncertainty about the degree to which an intermediary’s customer is in contact with
other intermediaries, see Green (2007).
9In that case, the payoﬀ of an intermediary is zero whenever at least two intermediaries take part in the bargaining,
since the surplus that can be achieved from any coalition is independent of the number of intermediaries, provided
that number is nonzero.
24investor, then   is similarly obtained, and depends on the probability that the investor is
captive.
The average of an intermediary’s share of gains across the population of investors is
 ( ) = 0 ×    +
1
2
(1 −   ) =
1 −   
2
.
In particular,  ( ) is decreasing in   if    is increasing in  . Obviously,  2 ≥  1.
Going beyond the case of   = 2, it is somewhat intuitive that an investor is more likely to
be well connected as the number of intermediaries increases. Appendix M brieﬂy outlines
a model with this natural feature.
Lowering   reduces an intermediary’s incentive to search, all else equal, because,
for given capital dynamics, lowering   reduces intermediation proﬁts, and therefore the
marginal beneﬁt of raising intermediation intensity. We will next illustrate the second
channel through which oligopolistic intermediation aﬀects capital mobility: By reducing
each intermediary’s bargaining power, the incentive to intermediate is lowered.
Endogenous bargaining leads to complex dynamics, in which the number of interme-
diaries actively searching for capital varies over time. In order to see this, consider a
candidate equilibrium in which   intermediaries search at full capacity whenever   >  ,
and no intermediary searches when   ≤  . If a single intermediary deviates by searching
for capital when   is in a left neighborhood of  , then his fee per unit of capital switched is
that of a monopolist, not that of the  -intermediary case. This increases the value of this
deviation. Despite this added complexity, we now show that oligopolistic intermediation
may reduce capital mobility. We focus on the case of zero recovery.
4.3 Reduced Capital Mobility With More Intermediaries
A Markov strategy proﬁle for   intermediaries consists of functions  1, 2,...,   on
[1,∞) into [0, ¯  / ]. Here,   ( ) denotes the search intensity of intermediary   when the
heterogeneity of capital across the two markets is   =  / . The aggregate capital mobility
is
 ( ) =
   
 =1
  ( ).
Let    denote the marginal gain to a investor from switching to the market with less
capital, given aggregate intensity policy  . In order to exploit the fee share  ( ) derived
25above, we focus on simple strategies, for which   ( ) is either 0 or ¯  / . With this restric-
tion,10 we can associate with any strategy proﬁle an increasing sequence  0, 1,...,  
of capital-ratio thresholds with the property that, whenever the capital ratio    is in
[  ,  +1), a particular set    of intermediaries is active. We let    = ∣  ∣ denote the
number of intermediaries in   .
Using our previous analysis of the oligopolistic case with ﬁxed bargaining power, we
say that a proﬁle of simple strategies is a Markov equilibrium if, for all   and   ∈ [  ,  +1),
 (  )  
 ( ) −   ≥ 0,   ∈   , (23)
and
 (   + 1)  
 ( ) −   ≤ 0,   / ∈   . (24)
The ﬁrst inequality means that any intermediary searching at level   does so optimally,
given equilibrium fee share  (  ). The second equation states that any intermediary not
searching at level   does so optimally, given the equilibrium fee share  (   + 1) that he
would get if he searched. We let    = inf{¯   :  ( ) = ¯  ,   ≥ ¯  }, the smallest level of
capital heterogeneity above which intermediaries search at full capacity. Thus,  1 denotes
the monopolistic threshold. For the result to follow, recall that   is the mean arrival rate
of loss events and that    depends, through  , on the particular Markov equilibrium
under consideration. The following result applies for all equilibria.
Proposition 7 For any   ≥ 2, there exists some ¯   > 0 such that for any   ∈ (0, ¯  ) and
any Markov equilibrium with   players associated with mean shock intensity  , we have
 1 <   .
In words, the reduced bargaining power caused by oligopolistic competition reduces
the domain of maximal capital mobility relative to that of the monopolistic case. A proof
of this proposition may be found in Appendix N. Proposition 7 shows that oligopolistic
competition results in less intermediation than achieved by a monopolist, for some range
of market heterogeneity. This does not, however, rule out intermediation by oligopolists at
capital ratios below the monopolistic trigger level. The next result shows that, provided
that loss events are suﬃciently rare, oligopolistic and monopolistic settings lead to a
cessation of intermediation at approximately the same levels of market heterogeneity.
10Extending the analysis to general Markov strategies would be possible if one computes, for any possible strategy,
the expected fee for each intermediary as a function of his search intensity and of the aggregate search intensity.
26For any  -intermediary Markov equilibrium with aggregate strategy  , let
   = inf{  :  ( ) > 0},
the smallest heterogeneity level above which capital mobility is nonzero. A proof of the
next proposition may be found in Appendix N.
Proposition 8 For any   > 0, there exists a strictly positive ¯   such that for any   ∈
(0, ¯  ) and any Markov equilibrium with   players and mean loss-event arrival rate  , we
have    ≥  1 −  .
Propositions 7 and 8 together show that capital mobility is lower, at any levels of
capital, with oligopolistic intermediation than with monopolistic intermediation, provided
that loss events are suﬃciently rare.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have examined a simple setting in which, absent trading frictions, investors would
adjust their portfolios so as to achieve the highest possible mean return for a given risk,
thereby equating mean returns across assets. Because of trading frictions, however, in-
vestors cannot instantaneously adjust their portfolios. Over time, investors make portfolio
adjustments that cause mean returns across markets to revert toward each other. In our
analysis, capital is mobilized through optimal intermediation. Although other market
microstructures may lead to similar patterns of adjustment of capital and mean returns,
we are particularly focused on the endogenous role of intermediaries.
For example, in corporate bond markets, which are not traded on a central exchange,
one observes large price drops and delayed price recovery in connection with major down-
grades or defaults, as described by Hradsky and Long (1989) and Chen, Lookman, and
Sch¨ urhoﬀ (2008), when certain classes of investors have an incentive or a contractual re-
quirement to sell their holdings. Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) document the
eﬀect on convertible bond hedge funds of large capital redemptions in 2005. Convertible
bond prices dropped and rebounded over several months. A similar drop-and-rebound
pattern was observed in connection was the LTCM collapse in 1998. Newman and Rierson
(2003) show that large issuances of credit-risky bonds temporarily raise credit spreads
27throughout the issuer’s sector, because providers of liquidity such as underwriters and
hedge funds bear extra risk as they search for long-term investors. They provide empir-
ical evidence of temporary bulges in credit spreads across the European Telecom debt
market during 1999-2002 in response to large issues by individual ﬁrms in this sector.
Examples of slow price adjustments to supply shocks in equity markets include those
of Holthausen and Mayers (1990), Scholes (1972), Coval and Staﬀord (2007), Andrade,
Chang, and Seasholes (2008), Kulak (2008), and, with respect to index recomposition
events, Shleifer (1986), Harris and Gurel (1986), Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000),
Chen, Noronha, and Singhal (2004), and Greenwood (2005).
Our introduction uses the example of the market for catastrophe risk reinsurance.
Sudden price surges, then multi-year price declines, follow sudden large aggregate claims
against providers of insurance at times of major natural disasters, as explained by Froot
and O’Connell (1999). Periods of high re-insurance rates are typically accompanied by
new entrants to the market, including hedge funds and other new re-insurers, whose
capital has been mobilized by the price discrepancy, but not immediately. It takes time
to set up and capitalize a viable new provider of catastrophe risk insurance.
In these examples, the time pattern of returns or prices after a supply or demand shock
reveals that the friction at work is not merely a transaction cost for trade. If that were the
nature of the friction, then all investors would immediately adjust their portfolios, or not,
optimally. The new market price and expected return would be immediately established,
and remain constant until the next change in fundamentals. In all of the above examples,
however, after the immediate price response, whose magnitude reﬂects the size of the
shock and the degree of short-term price elasticity, there is a relatively lengthy period
of time over which the price reverts in mean toward its new fundamental level. In the
meantime, of course, additional shocks can occur, with overlapping consequences. The
typical pattern suggests that the initial price response is larger than would occur with
perfect capital mobility, and reﬂects the demand curve of the limited pool of investors that
are quickly available to absorb the shock. The speed of adjustment after the initial price
response is a reﬂection of the time that it takes more investors to realign their portfolios
in light of the new market conditions, or for the initially responding investors to gather
more capital.
In our model, delays in portfolio adjustments are due to the time that it takes for
28intermediaries to locate suitable investors. This is only an abstraction, which can also
proxy for other forms of delay, including time to educate investors about assets with which
they have limited familiarity (awareness), time for contracting, and time for investors to
dispose of their current positions, which could involve similar delays and price shocks,
as suggested by Chaiserote (2008). Some of the delays in practice could be due to time
for information about investment opportunities to percolate through the population of
suitable investors. Incorporating informational diﬀerences in our model would, however,
involve substantial complications.
We have assumed that the markets segmented by intermediation frictions are sym-
metric in all respects other than the level of capital in each. Thus, diﬀerences in mean
returns, and the value of moving capital from one market to another, are entirely due
to the nature of intermediation and diﬀerences in capital levels. We could, however, ex-
tend the model so as to treat asymmetric markets. Provided that the dividend functions
satisfy similar homogeneity assumptions, intermediation would be characterized by two
distinct thresholds of capital ratios, one for movement of capital from market   to market
 , and another for the reverse movement. For example, if returns in market   are riskier
than those in market  , then, all else equal, capital will be less mobile toward market  
than toward market  . Asymmetry, for example, would allow a consideration of capital
mobility from a low-risk “money market” into a high-risk market such as that for catas-
trophe risk or private equity. Many of the qualitative features of our symmetric model,
such as the dynamics of capital mobility and the impact of intermediation competition,
are anticipated to carry over to asymmetric settings, at least under regularity conditions.
Another natural extension concerns the case of three or more markets. Consider, for
example, three symmetric markets diﬀering only in their capital levels, and satisfying our
homogeneity conditions. We conjecture that capital will ﬂow exclusively to the highest
premium market, with more mobility from the the lowest-premium market than from the
mid-premium market one. Moreover, when these two ﬂows are strictly positive, the gains
from switching will be equalized across the two ﬂows, with the lower mobility from the
mid-premium market just oﬀsetting its lower immediate premium diﬀerential, illustrating
the idea that future capital mobility aﬀects today’s gain from switching.
29Appendices
A An Insurance Example
We illustrate the model with an example motivated by catastrophe insurance contracts.
In a particular market, at each of the event times of a Poisson process   with a constant
intensity  , a catastrophe occurs that causes losses throughout a population of consumers
who are potential buyers of protection. Each of a continuum of consumers in the given
insurance market has a property that experiences a loss at each catastrophe event. The
losses of the consumers at a given event are identically and symmetrically distributed.
The distribution of consumer losses at each catastrophe has the property that if a quantity
  of the consumers have bought insurance at the time of the  -th catastrophe, then total
claims of     are paid by sellers of protection, where  1, 2,... is a sequence of independent
random variables, identically distributed on [0,1], and independent of  . For this, it need
not be the case that the damage of a particular consumer at the  -th event is equal to the
average damage rate   , but we will assume so for notational simplicity only.
Each consumer chooses to be insured, or not, at each point in time, based on infor-
mation available up to that time, but of course not including the information about loss
events at precisely that time.11 Whenever insured, the consumer pays premiums at the
current rate    in his or her market, and is covered against damages in the event of a loss.
Consumer   in a particular market has an insurance purchase policy process  , valued in
{0,1}, providing total expected dis-utility of
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where    is the time of the  -th catastrophe,   is a discount rate, and  1 (⋅) and  2 (⋅)
are strictly decreasing dis-utility functions.
Given the additive nature of this utility, the insurance purchase policy   minimizes




 1 (   ) +   [ 2 ((1 −  )  )].
11The appropriate measurability restriction is “predictability.”
30This problem is solved by 0 or 1 depending on whether    is greater or less than some
reservation price   . We can therefore calculate, for each premium level  , the total
demand  ( ) =   ({  :    ≤  }) for insurance, where  (⋅) is the measure on the space
  of consumers in the market.12 Associated with the strictly decreasing demand function
 , assuming continuity, is a strictly decreasing and continuous inverse demand function
 (⋅). The expected loss rate is   (  ), so the risk premium is  ( )−  (  ). Alternative
approaches, for example partial coverage, could be used to model the inverse demand
function. In the end, to achieve a tractable solution of the intermediary’s problem, we
will make parametric assumptions for  (⋅) that can be justiﬁed by suitable construction
of  1 , 2 , and the measure  .
The cumulative insurance claims process   for a quantity of one unit of insurance sold
at all times is the compound Poisson is deﬁned by    =
  ( )
 =1   . In order to oﬀer one
unit of insurance in a particular market, a seller of protection is required to commit one
unit of capital. This is natural if one requires (say, as a regulatory matter) that insurance
is default free, under the assumption that the essential supremum of the fractional event
loss    is 1, which is the case in our illustrative numerical examples. (In any case, this
supremum loss can be taken to be 1 without loss of generality by normalization of the
deﬁnition of one unit of capital and of the associated construction of returns per unit of
capital.) Thus, in a given market with   units of available insurance capital, the demand
for insurance is  ( ( ) +   (  )) =  , because the risk premium  ( ) is positive and
providers of insurance capital have no better use for their capital at that moment in time.
Markets   and   are assumed to have identically distributed preferences among their
respective pools of buyers of protection, and thus have the same inverse-demand func-
tion  (⋅). Their cumulative proportional claims processes    and    are identically
distributed, but need not be independent. For example, some of the loss events could
strike both markets.
While capital is deployed in insurance market  , it is subject to the cumulative propor-
tional loss process    and is re-invested over time in a ﬁnancial asset with L´ evy cumulative
return process   . Investment in this additional local asset is allowed merely for generality.
The total cumulative proportional accumulation process for capital in market  , before
12In order for the premium rate  ( ) to be strictly decreasing in the capital level  , for simplicity we can take the
total measure  ( ) of buyers of protection to be inﬁnite.
31considering the movement of capital between the markets, is thus    = −   +   , where
   and    have the joint distribution described earlier for the general model. Given the
characteristics ( , , ) of the intermediation of capital between the two markets, the
primitives ( ,  ,  , , , , ) of our basic model are ﬁxed.
B Veriﬁcation of Optimality of HJB Solution
This appendix provides a proof that the HJB equation (14) characterizes optimality. For
this, given an arbitrary intensity process  , let
   =  
−  ˆ   ( 
 
  , 
 
  ) +
   
0
 
−    [ 
 
    
Γ( 
 
  , 
 
  ) −  ]  .
By Itˆ o’s Formula, a local martingale is deﬁned by
ˆ   ( 
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  )−
   
0
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  +  [ˆ   ( 
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Because   and ˆ   are bounded, this local martingale is in fact a martingale. From this
and the implication of the HJB equation that
− ˆ   ( 
 
  , 
 
  ) −  (ˆ   , 
 
  , 
 
  ,  ,Γ) ≤ 0,
another application of Itˆ o’s formula implies that   is the sum of a decreasing process
and a martingale. Thus,   is a supermartingale. Because ˆ   is bounded, we have the




−  ˆ   ( 
 
  , 
 
  )] = 0. (25)
Thus, for any intermediation intensity process  ,
ˆ   ( , ) ≥  ( , , ,Γ) ≡  
   ∞
0
 
−    [ 
 
    
Γ( 
 
  , 
 
  ) −  ]  
 
. (26)
Let Λ be a policy such that, for each ( , ), Λ( , ) attains the supremum (7). For each
 , let  ∗
  = Λ(  ,  ). Then, the fact that
− ˆ   (  ,  ) −  (ˆ   ,  ,  , 
∗
 ,Γ) = 0
implies that   is a martingale. Thus
ˆ   ( , ) =  ( , , 
∗,Γ). (27)
32Thus, for any intermediation intensity process  ,
 ( , , 
∗,Γ) ≥  ( , , ,Γ),
proving the result.
C Nonnegativity of the Gain From Switching  
In order to prove Proposition 2, we rewrite (8) as
(  + 2  +  ( )(   + (1 −  ))) ( ) +  (1 +  ) ( ) 
′( ) = (1 +   0)(1 −  
− ). (28)
Because the righthand side is strictly positive,   or  ′ must be strictly positive. This
implies that   cannot cross 0 from above. Hence,   must be strictly positive on some
interval of the form ( ,∞), and is non-positive on [1, ] for some level  . It remains to
show that   = 1. Because  (1) = 0, the intermediary does not search when the markets
have equal levels of capital, given that   > 0. That is,  ( ) vanishes on a neighborhood
of 1. From (28), this implies that   is positive on that neighborhood, which concludes
the proof.
D Valuation of Search Costs
The conservation equation is
  ( , ) +   ( , ) +   ( , ) =  ( , ) −   ( , ),
where  ( , ) is the present value of the total future cash ﬂows at rate    (  )+   (  ),
to be divided among the intermediaries and the investors, and   ( , ) is the the in-
termediary’s expected discounted search costs over the inﬁnite horizon, given a trigger
 .
Because   is homogeneous of degree −1, we have  ( , ) = 2/ . The search-cost
present value   (1,0) solves
  (1,0) =   +  [ 
−    (1,0)],
33where   is present value of search costs from time zero to the exponentially distributed
time   of the next loss event. We now show that, for the case of no recovery at loss event,
  (1,0) =
 ¯  
 
 
1 −  
−(2 + ) ( ) 
, (29)
where  ( ) = log(1 + 1/ )/¯  .
Homogeneity implies that this present value returns to the same level at each loss
event, so
  (1,0) =   +  [ 
−    (1,0)], (30)
where   is the time until the ﬁrst to arrive of the loss events in the two markets, which is
exponentially distributed with parameter 2 . Starting with  0 = 1 and  0 = 0, we have
    = −¯    1{ t> }  
and
    = ¯    1{ t> }   .
This yields    =  −¯    and    = 1 −  −¯   , for   <  . The intermediary will stop searching
at that time  ( ) at which   ( ) =  , so
 −¯   ( )
1 −  −¯   ( ) =  .
This yields









The present value of search costs until the next loss event is
  =  
   min( ( ), )
0
 
−  ¯     
 
=
¯   
 
 
1 −  [ 
−  min( ( ), )]
 
.
Because   is exponentially distributed with parameter 2 ,
 ( 
−  ) =
2 
2  +  
and
 [ 
−  min( ( ), )] =
2 
2  +  
[1 −  
− (2 + ) ( )].
Substitution of these into (30) yields the result (29).
34E Proof of Proposition 3
That   is bounded follows from the fact that it is dominated by 2/ . The monotonicity
result is based on two intermediate lemmas.
First, given the function   determining intermediation fees, let
 ( ) =
 
1 −  
−  
 
1 +   0
  + 2 
 
−  ( ).
The ﬁrst term of  ( ) is the present value of switching capital to the under-capitalized
market if the intermediary arrests intermediation eﬀorts from the point at which the
capital ratio    is at   until the next loss event occurs, given  0. Suppose in particular, a
given reduced policy  ( ) = Λ( ,1), and a particular   at which  ( ) = 0. Then  ( ) = 0.
As a special case,  (1) = 0 (which can also be checked directly from the deﬁnition of  
and the fact that  (1) = 0). We note that, since the ﬁrst term deﬁning   is strictly
increasing in  ,  ′( ) must be positive whenever  ′( ) is negative. Given a policy  , we
will show that   is nonnegative. In order to see this, we observe that for   ≥ 1, (28) can
be re-written as
 ( )[((1 −  ) +   )  +  (1 +  ) 
′] = (  + 2 ) ( ). (31)
We already know that  (1) = 0. Since   is positive from Proposition 2, this implies that
 ′( ) is negative whenever  ( ) ≤ 0, and hence that  ′ > 0 whenever   ≤ 0. Therefore,
  cannot cross 0 from above, which proves our ﬁrst lemma.
Lemma 1 For any policy,   is everywhere nonnegative.
This result is intuitive: other things equal, the expected gain from moving one’s capital
is larger if the intermediary immediately stops switching capital after that last movement,
since the diﬀerence between capital levels, and hence between premia, is larger in that
case. Lemma 1 has a crucial consequence for the case   = 1: the rate at which fees are paid
to the intermediary when he searches is strictly increasing in  . The more heterogeneous
the markets, the higher is the intermediary’s immediate proﬁt from switching. Since this
rate of fee payment, net of search costs, is    ( )− , we must show that   ( ) is strictly
increasing in  . We can re-write (31) when   = 1 as
 ( )(1 +  )( ( ) +   
′( )) = (  + 2 ) ( ) +   ( ) ( ).
35Since   is positive and   is nonnegative, this implies that  ( )+  ′( ) is positive whenever
 ( ) > 0, hence that   ( ) is strictly increasing in  . On any interval on which  ( ) = 0,
we have  ( ) = (1 +   0)/(  + 2 )(1 − 1/ ), so   is strictly increasing, and, a fortiori, so
is   ( ).
Lemma 2 For   = 1 and any policy, the revenue rate   ( ) is strictly increasing in  .
We can now show monotonicity of   for any trigger policy. From (16),   is constant
for   ≤  . Starting with some capital ratio  0 =   >  ,
 ( ) =  
    
0
 
−  [  (  )   −  ]1{ t> }   +  
−   0
 
,
where   is the time of the next loss event. The function    → [  ( )  −  ]1 >  is nonde-
creasing in   from Lemma 2, and strictly increasing for   >  . For   <   <  ′, this implies
that  ( ) <  ( ′) (because the event time   has a distribution that does not depend on  
or  ′). This proves Proposition 3.
F Optimality of a Trigger Policy
This appendix shows that for any equilibrium pair ( , ), the reduced policy function  
must be a trigger policy. In fact, we will show that for any switching-gain function   that
can arise as the result of an admissible intermediation policy, equilibrium or otherwise,
the optimal policy must be of the trigger form.
From Appendix B, we know that, for a given  , any bounded solution of the HJB
equation yields an optimal policy. We also know that   is continuous (and, in fact,
diﬀerentiable) from (13). From Lemma 2, we also know that for any admissible policy,
  ( ) must be increasing. Finally   must be such that the value function   is bounded
by 2/ . These conditions deﬁne what we call “admissibility” of  . In particular, these
conditions must be satisﬁed in any equilibrium.
We ﬁrst show that there exists a solution to the HJB equation that is achieved by a
trigger policy. Then we verify that any policy that achieves the value function that solves
the HJB equation must be of the trigger form.
For any equilibrium, the function   is bounded, because




36Therefore, given any candidates for the capital trigger ratio   and the constant  1, one
can integrate the HJB equation (17) on [ ,∞). The smooth-pasting condition is satis-
ﬁed if  ′( ) = 0, and this is equivalent to the condition that    ( ) =  . (For this,
see (14).) Given  , this uniquely determines  , because   ( ) is strictly increasing in  
by Lemma 2. The only diﬃculty is to show the consistency condition  1 = (2 /2  +  ) 0
(see (16)), where  0 = lim →∞ ( ), noting that  0 enters as a coeﬃcient of ODE 17 (in
the constant  ). In order to show this, we exploit the linearity of the ODE (17). Making
the change of variables  ( ) =  ( ) −  1, we have  ( ) = 0. The dynamics of   do not
depend on  0, in that
 ( ) +   (1 +  ) 
′( ) =  ( ), (32)
where  ( ) = ¯  (   ( ) −  )/(  + 2 ) and   = ¯  /(  + 2 ) > 0 is positive on ( ,∞).
Moreover, the limit  ∞ is by construction equal to  0− 1. This allows us to re-express the
consistency condition as  ∞ = ( /2  +  ) 0. Therefore, having integrated   over [ ,∞),
one may simply read oﬀ the values  0 and  1. The resulting function  ( ) =  ( )+ 1 solves
the initial HJB equation with a  0-dependent coeﬃcient, and also satisﬁes the smooth
pasting condition.
Thus, for any admissible  , there is an optimal policy of the trigger form. To conclude,
we will show that there are no policies solving the HJB equation that are not of the trigger
form. This follows from the linearity in ℓ of the HJB equation, implying a bang-bang
solution, which is strict because indiﬀerence is characterized by the equation    ( ) =  ,
which has a unique solution by Lemma 2. This analysis is summarized as follows.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the payout-rate function   is of the form  ( ) =   +  / .
Then any equilibrium intermediation policy Λ corresponds to a trigger capital ratio  .
That is Λ( , ) = ¯  1{ /  > }.
G Existence of Equilibrium
So far, we have shown that any equilibrium must be of the trigger form. In this appendix
we show that there exists such an equilibrium. Appendix H shows uniqueness of such
equilibria.
For any candidate trigger capital ratio  , let  (  ∣ ) be the net expected gain from
switching capital across markets under the policy with trigger  , given current market
37heterogeneity  . We need to show that there exists some   such that    (  ∣ ) =  , that
is, such that the intermediary ceases intermediation, given the switching gain function
 (⋅) =  (⋅∣ ), exactly when   =  . It suﬃces to show that   (  ∣ ) takes all values
between 0 and ∞ as   varies from 1 to ∞.
Because   ( ) is increasing, equation (12) implies that
 (  ∣ ) ≥
(  − 1)
 (  + 2 )
,   ≥  .
This implies that   (  ∣ ) ≥ (  − 1)/(  + 2 ). We note that the lower bound grows
linearly with  . Because   (  ∣ ) = 0 for   = 1, we know that    →   (  ∣ ) goes
from 0 to ∞ as   goes from 0 to ∞. This function is continuous, so there exists some   ∗
such that   ∗ (  ∗ ∣  ∗) =  / .
Proposition 10 Suppose that the payout-rate function   is of the form  ( ) =  + / .
Then, there exists an equilibrium with a trigger policy.
H Proof of Uniqueness of Trigger
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that trigger levels   and  ,   <  , both satisfy
the equations of the proposition. Let  ( ) =   ( )−  ( ) denote the diﬀerence between
the gains from switching capital under policies   and  , as a function of  . (Throughout,
we use superscripts to denote dependence on   or  .) From (18),   <   implies that
  
0 >   
0 . Optimality of   (respectively  ) with respect to    (respectively,   ) implies
that, for any   in ( , ],
   
 ( ) −   −  (1 +  )( 
 )
′( ) > 0
and
   
 ( ) −   −  (1 +  )( 
 )
′( ) ≤ 0.
Because (  )′( ) = 0 for   in this interval (  <  ], while (  )′( ) ≥ 0 by Proposition 3,
we know that  ( ) < 0. Subtracting the version of equation (10) for   from the version
of the same equation for   yields
(  +  )  +  (1 +  ) 






,   >  , (33)
38where
  =
  + 2 
¯  
+ (1 −  ) > 0
and
  =
 (  




Because  ( ) < 0, this13 implies that   < 0 for   >  , so that   is everywhere negative.
By deﬁnition,  0 is the marginal value of capital held by investors in the overcapitalized






where Φ0 is the expected discounted value of all future fees that investors will pay to the
intermediary. (Recall that 2/  is the expected discounted stream of dividends paid on
both market; see the “conservation equation” (9).) We have seen that   < 0, that is,
  ( ) >   ( ) for all   >  . This means that investors pay, for any  , more fees with  
than with   for   >  . Moreover, for   ∈ [ , ], investors pay fees (which are positive,
from Proposition 2) for trigger  , whereas they pay nothing for trigger  . Therefore,
Φ 
0 > Φ 
0 , which implies from (34) that   
0 <   
0 , a contradiction. ■
I Algorithm for Trigger Calculation
In general, (18) provides the following ﬁxed-point algorithm for computing the equilibrium
trigger capital ratio  .
Combining (17), the equation obtained by diﬀerentiating (17), as well as the equa-
tion (13) for  , yields the second-order linear ordinary diﬀerential equation for  :
  ( ) + (  + 2 ) (1 +  ) 
′( ) +  
2(1 +  )
2 
′′( ) =   +   ,   ≥  , (35)
where   = ( −1) ,   = ( + ),   =  ( −1)−  , and   =   . We bear in mind that some
of the coeﬃcients of this equation depend on a constant to be determined,  0 =   (1,0).
1. Start with some candidate value for  0, which we call  0. From (9) and (18) we can
then determine values for  0 and   (it is easy to show that such values always exist).
Call   0 the corresponding trigger level. Furthermore, (16) provides a corresponding
value for  (  0).
13Indeed,  ( ) = 0 implies that  ′( ) < 0, so   cannot cross zero from below.
392. Starting with the initial conditions  (  0) and  ′(  0) = 0, evaluate a candidate for
 (∞) = lim →∞  ( ) by integration of the diﬀerential equation (35) on [  0,∞).
3. The limit  (∞) corresponds to a new value for  0 (since  (∞) =   (1,0) =  0), which
we call  1.
4. These steps are iterated until a ﬁxed point is reached.
We have considered methods for speeding up the computation.14
J HJB Analysis with Partial Recovery
In this appendix, we analyze the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the case of general
proportional losses. The equation for   is given in Section 3.5. The equation for   is
0 = −  ( , ) +  ( ) −   ( , ) Λ( , ) +   ( , ) Λ( , )
+  (   <  )[ ( ( ,  )∣   <  ) −  ( , )]
+  (   ≥  )[ ( (  , )∣   ≥  ) −  ( , )]
+  [( ( ,  ) −  ( , )].
We let Φ(⋅) denote the cumulative recovery-rate distribution function associated with
the fractional event loss measure  . That is, Φ( ) = 1 −  ([0, ]). We let  ( ) =  ( ,1)
and ℎ( ) =  ( ,1), obtaining the coupled equations




+ Λ( ,1)(1 −  )(ℎ( ) −  ( ))
+  
   1
1/ 
  (  ) Φ  +





















14One can prove that  ′ ∼ log( )/ 2 as   goes to ∞. Unfortunately, this convergence rate is not particularly
fast. A possible improvement is to integrate   numerically up to some value ˆ   above which non-dominant terms
in (35) are neglected. Above ˆ  , the simpliﬁed equation becomes 2 2 ′( ) +  3 ′′( ) =  , which implies that  ′( ) =
 ′(ˆ  )+log( )/ 2 −log(ˆ  )/(ˆ  )2, which can be integrated to yield  ( )− (ˆ  ) in closed form (up to the simpliﬁcation of
the equation).
40and
(  + 2  + Λ( ,1) )ℎ( ) + Λ( ,1)(1 +  ) ℎ
′( )
= 1 +  
   1
1/ 
ℎ(  ) Φ  +



















As opposed to the case of total loss, these equations cannot be combined to yield a single
equation for   = ℎ −  , because of diﬀering integrands.
Letting  ( ) =   ( ,1), the 0-homogeneity of   implies that the value after a loss
event is  (  ) if    ≥  ,  (1/  ) if    ≤  , and  ( / ) if the loss occurs on the smaller
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 Φ  − 2 ( )
  
. (38)
The equation reduces to
(  + 2 ) ( ) =  
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1/ 
 (  ) Φ  +
















,   ∈ [1, ],
and
(  + 2 ) ( ) +  (1 +  )  ( )
′ = [   ( ) −  ] 
+  
   1
1/ 
 (  ) Φ  +
















,   ≥  . (39)
The smooth-pasting condition is
(1 +  )  
′( ) =    ( ) −  . (40)
K Algorithm for Partial Recovery Model
This appendix includes an algorithm for solving the partial-recovery equations of the pre-
vious appendix. The algorithm exploits the linearity of the integro-diﬀerential equations
for  , ℎ, and  , which arise thanks to the special structure of our problem.
41K.1 Primitives
The parameters are  ,  ,  ,  ,  , and the recover rate distribution function Φ : [0,1] →
[0,1], a beta distribution with given parameters. The algorithm will determine the trigger
level   for intermediation and the value functions  ,ℎ, and  .
K.2 Strategy
We use the following ﬁxed-point algorithm. Start with a value of  , then iterate the
following steps:
1. Numerically evaluate   and ℎ (which are independent of the rest of the system, given
 ).
2. Numerically evaluate   (which depends on  ,   and ℎ).
3. Use (40) to obtain a new value of  .
4. Stop if the last iteration is such that the new value of   is close enough to the value
of   at the beginning of the loop. Otherwise, return to the ﬁrst step.
Separate analysis shows that the solution   lies in 1 ≤   ≤ 1 +  (  + 2 )/  which
bounds the starting value.
The remaining subsections provide guidelines for the realization of each step. Except
for the last subsection, the value of   is ﬁxed.
K.3 A system of equations for   and ℎ
We ﬁrst discretize the equations for   and ℎ to obtain a linear system of equations of the
form
   =  .
The variable   ∈ [1,∞) is discretized: we use a grid   with  +1 points such that    =   ,
  ∈ {0,..., }, where   > 1 is ﬁxed. Such a grid is ﬁner near 1, where   is more likely to
be found. Considering other grids does not aﬀect the equations below.
To each    corresponds two rows of the matrix  , which is (2  + 2) × (2  + 2). The
vector   = [ ,ℎ] corresponds to the discretized values of the unknown functions   and
ℎ. In what follows,   = ( 0,...,  ) and ℎ = (ℎ0,...,ℎ ) are vectors approximating the
functions, and   is the concatenation of these vectors.
42For any condition   let 1  denote the function equal to 1 if   is true and 0 otherwise.
For   and   in  , we let  ( , ) =  1 > . Thus,   =   if   >   and 0 otherwise.
K.4 Discretization conventions
For any 0 ≤   <  ′ ≤ 1, we let  ( , ′) = Φ( ′) − Φ( ) denote the probability that the
recovery rate is between   and  ′, according to the stipulated beta distribution. For each
 , let    =  (  , )
In the computations to follow, we let  −1 = 1,   +1 =   ,  −1 =  0,   +1 =   ,
ℎ−1 = ℎ0, and ℎ +1 = ℎ .
K.5 Discretized Equations
The discretized equation for   yields, for   ∈ {0,..., },
  [  + 2  +   (   + (1 −  ))] +   +1
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The discretized equation for ℎ yields, for   ∈ {0,..., },
ℎ [  + 2  +     ] + ℎ +1
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+ ℎ −1
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  +1 −   −1
−  




  −1 +   
2  
,




   
 =0





2    
+
1




2    
+
1
2    −1
 
−  





















We index from 0 to 2  + 1 the rows and columns of   as well as the rows of  . Indices
from 0 to   correspond to equations or variables related to  , while indices from  +1 to
2 +1 correspond to equations or variables related to ℎ. The above discretized equations
determine the coeﬃcients of   and  . First,    = 1/   for   ≤   and    = 1 for   >  , as is
clear from the above. We can decompose   into four (  + 1) × (  + 1) submatrices as
  =
⎡
⎣    
   
⎤
⎦.
The coeﬃcients of these submatrices are determined by the previous discretized equations.
We have
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For all   and   <   − 1,
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The coeﬃcients of the matrices  , , and   can be obtained similarly.
Once   is computed, we solve the system  [ ;ℎ] =  . This yields the vector of
candidate values for   and ℎ that is needed in the next step of the algorithm.
For   = 100, the system can easily be solved by any reasonable computation package,
as long as   is invertible. Usual algorithms proceed by factorization of   and direct
computation of the solution by pivot methods, which are faster and more robust than
inversion of  .
44K.7 Computation of  
We discretize the equation for   similarly, using the candidate values of   and ℎ obtained
in the previous step. The goal of this subsection is to determine the coeﬃcients of the
matrix   and a vector   deﬁning the system    =  , where   ∈ ℝ
 +1
+ is the discretization
vector of the function  ,   is a (  + 1) × (  + 1) square matrix, and   is an (  + 1)-
dimensional vector.
The discretized equation for   = ( 0,...,  ) yields for   ∈ {0,... }, keeping the same
notational scheme used before and, letting  −1 =  0 and   +1 =   ,
  [  + 2 ] +   +1
    (1 +   )
  +1 −   −1
+   −1
−    (1 +   )
  +1 −   −1
−  
   
 =0
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2max{  −1,  }
 
=   [   (ℎ  −   ) −  ]. (43)
Therefore, the right-hand side of the linear system is    =   [   (ℎ  −   ) −  ]. The
coeﬃcients   are determined as were those of  .
K.8 New Value of  
The last step of the loop of the ﬁxed-point algorithm is the determination of a new
candidate trigger level of  . Discretizing (40) yields the condition, for   =   
(1 +   )  
  +1 −   −1
  +1 −   −1
=    (ℎ  −   ) −  .
The new candidate value of   is thus the element of the grid   whose corresponding index
  is the closest to satisfying the above equation.
L Diﬀusion Risk
In this appendix, we allow invested capital to be exposed to diﬀusive reinvestment risk.
Speciﬁcally, we suppose that the L´ evy process    driving proportional capital changes
45in market   is the sum of a Brownian motion    and an independent compound Poisson
process. The value function retains the same degree of homogeneity found in the main
text.
With perfect correlation between the Brownian sources of risk in the two markets,   
and   , the analysis is identical to that shown in the main text.
More generally, suppose that the Brownian motions    and    have volatility param-
eter   and correlation parameter  . In the remainder of this appendix, we derive the
characterizing equations for   and  , then   and ℎ.
To clarify computations with diﬀusion terms, we temporarily consider investor wealth.
Let ˜  ( , , ) and ˜  ( , , ) denote the present value of having   units of capital initially
in the large and small markets, respectively. Of course, ˜  ( , , ) =   ( , ), where
 ( , ) = ˜  ( , ,1). Similarly, ˜  ( , , ) =  ( , ), where  ( , ) = ˜  ( , ,1). We
ﬁrst provide equations for ˜   and ˜  , and then use those to derive equations for   and  .
We assume, to begin, zero recovery. As before, we can take the drift rate   to be zero
without loss of generality. We have
−   ˜  ( , , ) +   ( ) − ˜   ( , , ) Λ( , ) + ˜   ( , , ) Λ( , )





2[ ˜    ( , , ) 
2 + ˜    ( , , ) 
2 + ˜    ( , , ) 
2]
+  
2[    ˜    ( , , ) +    ˜    ( , , ) +     ˜    ( , , )] = 0 (44)
and
−   ˜  ( , , ) +   ( ) − ˜   ( , , ) Λ( , ) + ˜   ( , , ) Λ( , )





2[ ˜    ( , , ) 
2 + ˜    ( , , ) 
2 + ˜    ( , , ) 
2]
+  
2[    ˜    ( , , ) +     ˜    ( , , ) +    ˜    ( , , )] = 0, (45)
where we used the fact that, when the investor is in market  , the correlation between  
and   is 1, and the correlation between   and   is  . The symmetric correlations apply
when the investor is in market  .
Using the fact that ˜   ( , ,1) =  ( , ), ˜    ( , ,1) = 0, ˜    ( , ,1) =   ( , ),
and ˜    ( , ,1) =   ( , ), with identical relations between ˜  ,  , and their derivatives,
46we get the following equations for   and   (letting   = 1 in the previous equations):
−   ( , ) +  ( ) −   ( , ) Λ( , ) +   ( , ) Λ( , )





2[   ( , ) 
2 +    ( , ) 
2] +  
2[      ( , ) +    ( , ) +     ( , )] = 0
(46)
and
−   ( , ) +  ( ) −   ( , ) Λ( , ) +   ( , ) Λ( , )




2[   ( , ) 
2 +    ( , ) 
2]
+  
2[      ( , ) +     ( , ) +    ( , )] = 0. (47)
If   is homogeneous of degree − , then so is  . In this case, letting  ( ) =  ( ,1),
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In this appendix, we outline a model with the natural feature that an investor is increas-
ingly likely to be in contact with multiple intermediaries at the point of bargaining as the
total number of intermediaries is increased.
47Suppose that there is an advertising medium handling intermediary ads. An inter-
mediary’s eﬀort corresponds to the probability   that its advertisement will place the
intermediary in contact with an investor at the time at which the investor checks the
medium. We assume that   is bounded by some capacity constraint ¯   < 1. Each investor,
pairwise independently across investors, has some exogenous intensity   for the times of
monitoring his capital and observing the advertising medium.15 This is consistent with
the framework of our main model: The intensity of times at which an investor is contacted
by least one intermediary is    ( ), where
  ( ) = 1 − (1 −  )
 .
Then,   =    (¯  ) is the intermediation capacity parameter of the basic model. Assuming
that a well-connected investor initiates bargaining with a randomly selected intermediary
from among those contacted, each intermediary has maximal contact intensity  / . The
probability that, when in contact with an intermediary, an investor is in contact with at
least two intermediaries is
  ( ) = 1 − (1 −  )
  −   (1 −  )
 −1.
For a ﬁxed   ∈ [0,1], let ¯    solve   (¯   ) =  , so that ¯   is independent of  , as in our
basic model. One may easily check that ¯    is decreasing in  . Moreover, using that
  (  ) = ¯   −    (1 −   )
 −1 = ¯   −
(1 − ¯  )   
1 −   
,
one can show that   (  ) is increasing in  .16 Therefore, keeping constant the ﬂow of
investors being contacted at any given time, the average number of intermediaries in
contact with any given investor is increasing in  . As the number of intermediaries goes
to inﬁnity, the probability that investor is well connected is:
lim
 →∞
  (  ) = ¯   + (1 − ¯  )log(1 − ¯  ).
The second term is negative. This speciﬁcation can be generalized to an arbitrary number
of media, with the same result that    is increasing in  .
15At such times, the investor observes the medium and plays a bargaining game with advertised intermediaries. If
bargaining breaks down, the investor leaves his capital in the large market, until the next monitoring time.
16In order to verify this, one is to show that   n/(1− n) is decreasing. Expressing  n in terms of   = (1− ¯  )−1 > 1
and letting   = 1/ , this is equivalent to showing that ( x − 1)/  is increasing in  . This is easily done by checking
the positivity of the derivative, whose numerator is increasing in   =  x and vanishes for   = 1.
48N Proofs of Section 4.3
Proof of Proposition 7. As before, we let   
0 =  (1,0), under strategy  . For any
equilibrium with aggregate mobility    →  ( ) and fee    →  ( ), one can easily modify
the proof of Lemmas 1 and 2 to show that
 
 ( ) =
 
1 +    
0








is nonnegative and that    ( ) is increasing in  . If    ≤  1, we have
 
1(  ) =
 
1 +   1
0







where  1 and  1
0 denote the corresponding quantities for the monopolistic case, since the
intermediary does not search at   . Further,
 
 (  ) ≤
 
1 +    
0











1(  ) −  





0 −   
0
  + 2 
 
(   − 1). (50)
Since   
0 ≤ 2/  for any policy, there exists some ¯   such that for all   < ¯  , the righthand
side of (50) is bounded in norm by   whenever    ≤  1, since we have an upper bound
on  1 from (18). Choosing   below (1/ ( )−1/ (1))  and setting ¯   accordingly, we have
for any    ≤  1,
 (1)   




 ( )   





(  −  ( ) ) >  , (51)
which shows that it is strictly optimal for the monopolist to search at   , contradicting
the assumption that    ≤  1.
Proof of Proposition 8. At   , it cannot be strictly proﬁtable for an intermediary to
deviate by continuing to search and receive the net payoﬀ  (1)    (  ) −   per unit of
eﬀort, but it was proﬁtable to some intermediaries to search at a capital heterogeneity
just above   . This implies that    must satisfy the equation
 (1)   
 (  ) =  .
49We recall that in the monopolistic case,  1 satisﬁes the equation
 (1) 1 
1( 1) =  .
Therefore, it suﬃces to show that the roots of these two equations are arbitrarily close if
  is arbitrarily small. We have
 
 (  ) =
 
1 +    
0










1 +   1
0







Therefore,    and  1 must satisfy
 
1 +    
0
  + 2 
 
(   − 1) −
 
1 +   1
0
  + 2 
 
( 1 − 1) = 0,
which may be rewritten as
 
1 +    
0
  + 2 
 
(   −  1) =  
 
  
0 −  1
0
  + 2 
 
(1 +  1).
Since  1 is uniformly bounded from (18) and the  0’s are uniformly bounded by 2/ , the
righthand side is less than   if   is chosen small enough. The ﬁrst factor of the lefthand
side is equivalent to 1/  when   is small enough. Combining these observations shows
that ∣   −  1∣ ≤   for any arbitrary   > 0, provided that   is small enough.
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